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THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT AND THE THREAT OF
CHINESE ESPIONAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
Jonathan Eric Lewis*
Abstract
With the advent of computers and the Internet, American national security became
inexorably linked with the safeguarding of the nation's trade secrets and critical technological
infrastructure. In light of the threat posed by corporate and economic espionage, Congress passed
the Economic Espionage Act in 1996. The Economic Espionage Act was the first federal statute
to criminalize the theft of trade secrets.
The Economic Espionage Act had two primary provisions, one criminalizing domestic
economic espionage, and another criminalizing trade secret theft intended to benefit a foreign
power. Since the passage of the Act over a decade ago, the vast majority of law review articles
and commentaries have focused on the Economic Espionage Act's domestic provision. This
article seeks to fill a gap in the existing scholarship by focusing mainly on the provision that
criminalizes trade secret theft intended to benefit a foreign power. As the overwhelming number
of cases under this provision involved a connection with the Chinese government, this article
seeks to analyze the efficacy of the Economic Espionage Act by studying recent cases of Chinese
economic espionage in the United States. As such, this article takes a comprehensive look at
Chinese economic and military rivalry and focuses on several recent high-profile economic
espionage cases in California. Finally, I draw parallels between the problem of economic
* Jonathan Eric Lewis, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. expected, May 2010. The author would like
to thank Professor Lewis Kurlantzick for his comments.
espionage that Congress responded to in 1996 and the problem of hacking and cyber espionage
that the Obama Administration considers a vital national security concern.
Introduction
During the Cold War, Soviet espionage posed a danger to American national security.
The targets of Soviet espionage were primarily military and political.' The best-known Cold War
espionage case was United States v. Rosenberg, in which Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were
convicted of violating the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. § 32.2 The Rosenbergs were eventually
executed for having passed atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.
3
With the end of the Cold War, the American industrial base became the new target of
foreign espionage. 4 Foreign intelligence agencies began devoting substantial efforts to spying
upon American corporations seeking to steal American trade secrets.5 For instance, in 1990,
China's Ministry of State Security, ("MSS") formed as a joint intelligence and espionage service,
sent Bin Wu, a university professor, to the United States to acquire American high-tech items.
6
Wu was subsequently caught by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in a complex
scheme in which he sought to acquire night-vision technology for the Chinese military.' The
America of the 1990s had "become the chief target of the world's economic spies." 8 Because of
the dire threat of a foreign intelligence service pilfering American technology, Congress finally
1 See Darren Tucker, Comment, The Federal Government's War on Economic Espionage, 18 U. PA. L. REV. 1109
n.3 (1997).
2 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2nd Cir., 1952); 50 U.S.C. § 32 is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 794.
3 See Sam Roberts, Figure in Rosenberg Case Admits to Soviet Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.11, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/12/nyregion/12spy.html.
4 104 CONG. REC. S12201-14 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/EEAleghist.htm (discussing the Economic Espionage Act of 1996).
5 Id.; see also, IRA WINKLER, SPIES AMONG Us 81 (2005) (contending that "[a]lmost all foreign govermnents put
economics as the main focus of their intelligence efforts").
6 JOHN J. FIALKA, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 21-22 (1997).
7 Id. at 25, 28.
8 Id. at 4.
took action and passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA" or "the Act"), which made
the theft of trade secrets a federal crime. 9 The Act was a "single vehicle [that prohibited] the
theft of trade secrets and proprietary information by both private individuals and corporations
and by foreign governments acting on their behalf. . ."10 The Act was the first federal statute that
provided criminal penalties for the misappropriation of trade secrets. 
1
Testifying on the passage of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Senator Kohl of
Wisconsin stated that, "[s]ince the end of the cold war, our old enemies and our traditional
friends have been shifting the focus of their spy apparatus. Alarmingly, the new target of foreign
espionage is our industrial base. But for too many years, we were complacent and did not heed
these warnings."' 12 FBI Director Louis Freeh testified that in 1996 the FBI was investigating
allegations of economic espionage against the United States by over twenty different countries.13
The CIA noted that France, Israel, Russia, China, and Cuba were engaged in economic espionage
against the United States. 14
Over a decade has elapsed since the passage of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996;
however, the threat of foreign-sponsored economic espionage has by no means subsided.
15
9 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (1996).
10 http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/EEAleghist.htm.
II Ronald Abramson Theft of Trade Secrets Addressed, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 28, 1997.
12 142 CONG. REC. S 10,882-02 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
13 See Terry Philip Segal, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: A New Federal Prosecution Tool in the Fight
Against Espionage and Trade Secret Theft, 42-OCT B. B.J. 10, September/October 1998. For a cynical take on the
FBI's role in combating economic espionage, see Pamela B. Stuart, The Criminalization of Trade Secret Theft: The
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 4 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. 373, 374 (1998) ("While its full implications are not
yet apparent, the passage of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 might be viewed as the FBI agent full
employment act .... It is yet one more step in the progress of the effort to criminalize conduct that was formerly of
interest only to commercial lawyers.").
14 Chris Carr, Jack Morton, & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 162 (2000).
15 According to the FBI, billions of dollars are lost every year to foreign competitors who deliberately target
economic intelligence and trade secrets. Investigative Programs Counterintelligence Division: Focus on Economic
Espionage, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm (retrieved on September 19, 2008); for a reference to French
According to the FBI, China is currently linked to about a third of all economic espionage
cases. 16 Due to the severity of the threat, the FBI increased the number of agents working on
countering alleged Chinese espionage from 150 agents in 2001 to more than 350 agents as of
summer 2007.17 According to one author writing nearly a decade ago, "[b]y far the largest, most
problematic player is the People's Republic of China, ("PRC"), a nuclear power which is using
U.S. technology and some of the profits from a ballooning trade surplus with the United States to
modernize its army, navy, and air force."'18 U.S. allies also engage in economic espionage against
the United States; however, due to the particular economic and military challenges posed by
China, I shall focus on Chinese espionage in this paper.19
Chinese economic espionage is likely to increase in the years ahead and to appear in
different forms. This paper is the first to synthesize the numerous recent Economic Espionage
Act cases involving Chinese espionage. I argue that the Economic Espionage Act is a necessary,
but not sufficient, response to the threat of Chinese-government-sponsored economic espionage
activities that imperil American national security. 20 Although the drafters of this legislation were
prescient, with the exponential growth of the Internet and advanced technology in the decade
since, the threat of economic espionage now must be linked with the threat of foreign-
economic espionage see, Air France Denies Spying on Travelers, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 14, 1991, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/1991/09/14/spy .php.
16 David J. Lynch, FBI Goes on Offensive vs. Tech Spies, USA TODAY, July 24. 2007, 1 B, available at
http://usatoday.com/printedition/money/20070724/china spy2.art.htm; see also David J. Lynch, Law Enforcement
Struggles to Combat Chinese Spying, USA TODAY, July 23, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070723/1 a cover23.art.htm ("About one-third of all economic
espionage investigations are linked to Chinese government agencies, research institutes or businesses, according to
Bruce Carlson of the FBI's counterintelligence division, who leads the bureau's efforts to combat Chinese spying.").
France and Israel also engage in significant economic espionage against the United States. See, WINKLER, supra
note 5, at 93.
17 http://usatoday.com/printedition/money/20070724/china spy2.art.htm.
18 FIALKA, supra note 6, at 12.
19 Economic Espionage: Hearing Before the S. Select Intelligence and Terrorism Comm., S. Hrg. 104-499 (1996)
(statement of U.S. Gen Accounting Office).
20 FIALKA, supra note 6, at 206 (Fialka, writing in the late 1990s, called the EEA a "good start").
government supported computer hacking designed not only to steal trade secrets, but also to
disrupt our critical technological infrastructure.
21
The question is whether federal criminal law is the best mechanism for dealing with a
complex economic, political, and potential military threat from a 21St-century superpower. On
the one hand, the EEA has given federal prosecutors a framework to prosecute persons who, with
the aim of benefiting the Chinese governmental-industrial complex, seek to steal American trade
secrets. The EEA, however, cannot alone counter the threat posed by Chinese espionage. The
federal government should employ the EEA along with political and diplomatic initiatives aimed
at mitigating the threat of Chinese economic espionage. That said, Congress should revise the
Economic Espionage Act to include stricter penalties for the theft of trade secrets intended to
benefit a foreign government or entity. Furthermore, Congress should enact new federal
legislation that makes it a federal crime to aid knowingly, conspire to aid, or to engage in
computer hacking designed to steal trade secrets or to disrupt American corporate or
governmental computer systems with the intent of benefiting a foreign government or entity.
While there is already federal legislation criminalizing the unlawful use of a computer, Congress
should enact new, comprehensive anti-hacking legislation that would give federal prosecutors
further investigative authority and prosecutorial power to counteract foreign-government-
sponsored hacking.
This paper is divided into four parts. First, I shall discuss the myriad ways in which
legislators and commentators have defined economic espionage and, for coherence, shall focus
on Congress's definition of economic espionage in the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
21 See Ellen Messmer, Cyber Espionage: A Growing Threat to Business, PC WORLD, Jan. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id, 141474/printable.html.
Second, I will analyze several cases in which federal prosecutors have employed the Economic
Espionage Act in order to prosecute persons engaged in economic espionage intended to benefit
the Chinese government. 22 Third, I shall argue, in light of the serious national security threat
posed by Chinese governmental economic espionage in the United States, the EEA should be
revised to increase criminal penalties and to redefine what acts constitute economic espionage. I
shall also argue that the EEA, while an effective statute, cannot serve as a substitute for a
comprehensive political and diplomatic strategy aimed at countering Chinese espionage. Fourth,
I shall examine the vast number of computer hacking incidents of the past two years, incidents in
which intelligence officials attribute to the Chinese government. I will argue that the EEA
provides a good model for a federal criminal anti-hacking law that should be designed as a
counterintelligence provision.
I. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA)
A. Defining Economic Espionage
What exactly is economic espionage? According to the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, "[tihere is no consensus within the US government on the
definition of economic espionage." 23 The Counterintelligence Report, however, decided to use
the definition employed by the Attorney General, namely "the unlawful or clandestine targeting
or acquisition of sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy information; proprietary economic
information, or critical technologies. " 24 Economic espionage, or high-technology espionage, has
been colorfully defined as "a high-stakes cloak-and-dagger spy game - the theft of critical
22 As of September 2006, the FBI's office in Palo Alto, California, was investigating "approximately a dozen
economic espionage cases with suspected ties to China." K. Oanh Ha, Silicon Valley a Hotbed of Economic
Espionage?, THE ARGUS (Fremont-Newark, CA), Sept. 29, 2006, available at WL 16889362.
23 NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC
COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 2001 (2001), reprinted in DAVID J. LOUNDY, COMPUTER CRIME,
INFORMATION WARFARE, AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 584, 585.
24 id.
American technology and trade secrets by foreign companies and governments." 25 Political-
military espionage occurs when a foreign intelligence agency seeks to infiltrate another country's
political system to influence clandestinely the political process or to gain access to government-
held industrial and military secrets. Economic espionage occurs when a foreign intelligence
agency spies on foreign corporations and industry in order to gain a competitive advantage or to
utilize foreign technology as a means of bolstering its military capabilities.
26
One writer has succinctly defined economic espionage as "business spying against an
American company. More specifically, it's theft, copying, or destruction of a trade secret, meant
to harm the trade secret's owner and to benefit a foreign government or its interests." 27 Canadian
intelligence has defined economic espionage as "illegal, clandestine, coercive, or deceptive
activity engaged in or facilitated by a foreign government designed to gain unauthorized access
to economic intelligence, such as proprietary information or technology, for economic
advantage. ' 28 Yet another author has defined economic espionage as "a foreign government's
sponsoring, coordinating, or assisting intelligence efforts directed at a domestic government,
corporation, establishment, or person that involves the unlawful or clandestine targeting or
acquisition of (1) trade secrets or (2) sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy
information."
29
25 Robert Cohen, Business Replaces Militaryfor Spies, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 4, 2001, available at WL
1097274.
26 See Karen Sepura, Economic Espionage: The Front Line of a New World Economic War, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L.
& COM. 127, 129 (1998) (defining traditional espionage as "the way in which spies acquire an enemy's military
secrets").
27 John Mangel, Economic Espionage Losses in the Billions, Experts Say, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 20,
2001, available at WL 251403.
28 Sepura, supra note 26, at n.5.
29 Tucker, supra note 1, at 1112.
Notable in the latter definition is that the focus of the foreign government's intelligence
efforts could be on a "domestic government," or a "[domestic] corporation." 30 Thus, according to
this author's definition, economic espionage would occur when the foreign intelligence service
of Country X spies on either American Agency Y or American Corporation Z. The problem
with this definition is that it is too broad. Foreign intelligence service X's spying on American
Agency Y is traditional political-military espionage because the target is the American
government. When foreign intelligence service X devotes its energies to spying on private
American Corporation Z, X is conducting economic espionage.
For the purposes of this paper, the working definition of economic espionage comes from
§ 1831 of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, which deals with foreign-sponsored
espionage. 31 Section 1831(a) defines economic espionage as the acts of a person who
"knowingly performs targeting or acquisition of trade secrets to ...knowingly benefit any
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent." 32 Unlike the broader definition of
economic espionage as including the targeting of "sensitive financial, trade, or economic policy
30 Id.
31 18 U.S.C. § 183 1(a)-(b) (1996). Statute reads in full:
1831. Economic espionage
(a) In general. --Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign
instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly--
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception
obtains a trade secret;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or
converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3),
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in
subsection (b), be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Organizations.--Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $10,000,000.
32 18 U.S.C. § 183 1(a) (1996); see also Investigative Programs Counterintelligence Division: Focus on Economic
Espionage, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm (retrieved on Sept. 19, 2008).
information," the EEA defines economic espionage solely in terms of "trade secrets." 33 Although
the statutory text of the EEA does not preclude the holder of the misappropriated trade secret
from being an American governmental agency34 , the legislative history of the EEA makes it
reasonably clear that Congress intended to protect corporate trade secrets.
35
Notwithstanding the statutory definition of economic espionage, a consideration of how
Congress might have defined it differently bolsters the notion that Congress defined economic
espionage correctly.. Indeed, Congress might have adopted the Canadian intelligence service's
definition and created a statute that singularly criminalized foreign-government-sponsored
espionage of a purely economic nature. 36 Such a statute would have had a broader reach than the
EEA.37 Congress, however, decided to criminalize the theft of trade secrets by both foreign
intelligence services and corporate competitors in separate provisions, §§ 1831 and 1832.38
While the statutory definition of economic espionage in the EEA is the one that federal
prosecutors must rely on in prosecuting cases involving the theft of trade secrets, Congress, as in
all cases, retains the option to revise the statutory definition in the future.
33 18 U.S.C. § 183 1(a)(1).
34 See 18 U.S.C. § 183 1(a)(1) ("obtains a trade secret"). The statutory text of Section 1831 does not explicitly
mention who the holder of the trade secret would have to be in order for the EEA to come into play. For a definition
of "trade secret" under the EEA and subsequent case law, see Part IC, infra.
31 See H.R. REP. No. 104-788 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 1996 WL 532685 ("[T]here is
considerable evidence that foreign governments are using their espionage capabilities against American
companies.").
36 The traditional statutory espionage provision is found at 18 U.S.C. § 794 ("Gathering or delivering defense
information to aid a foreign government") (effective Oct. 11, 1996). 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) criminalizes the conduct of
"[w]hoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits ... either directly or indirectly, any document, writing,
code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument,
appliance, or information relating to the national defense ......
37 The Chinese government-sponsored espionage in the United States which seeks to steal corporate trade secrets
often has a traditional military espionage component. For instance, there are several cases when the Chinese
government or its agents have encouraged or sponsored economic espionage against American defense contractors.
See infra, Part lI.B.
38 See infra, Part I.B.
B. Congress Responds to the Problem of Economic Espionage
Prior to the passage of the EEA, federal prosecutors relied on three statutes to prosecute
the theft of trade secrets: 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); and 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (National Stolen Property Act). 39 According to one Assistant U.S. Attorney
working on computer crime, "[f]ederal prosecutors often had difficulty fitting trade secret cases
within the existing statutes." 40 According to Thierry Desmet, this was "because corporate spying
does not involve the use of the mail or wire." 41 This is overstated, because, although not the case
42in many of the § 1831 cases , corporate spying might well involve the use of the mail or
telecommunications However, technological advances often outpaced the federal government's
resources to counter new forms of crime.
Dowling v United States is instructive.43 In Dowling, prosecutors had used the National
Stolen Property Act to prosecute the distributor of bootlegged Elvis Presley records. The
National Stolen Property Act, for instance, criminalizes the interstate shipment of stolen "goods,
wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more." 44 However, the
statute's definition of stolen property did not appear to reach intangible, intellectual property.
45
39 Id. at n.258; see also, Thierry Olivier Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Are We Finally Taking
Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 93, 103-04 (1999).
40 George "Toby" Dilworth, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: An Overview, U.S. ATT'Ys BULL.,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamay200l 6htm, (accessed Sept. 19, 2008); see also, James M.
Fischer, An Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 239, 248-49 (2001).
41 Desmet, supra note 40, at 104; see also, Fischer, supra note 4 1, at 250, n.62 (noting that, in his testimony to the
House Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary in 1996, FBI Director Freeh asserted that the non-
tangible nature of proprietary information caused some prosecutors to decline prosecuting economic espionage
cases).
42 See infra, Part II.B.
43 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
44 18 U.S.C. § 2314 reads, in pertinent part, "[w]hoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same
to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud...") (emphasis added).
45 Desmet, supra note 39, at 104 n.27 ("The NSPA was designed, however, to prevent traditional property crimes
and it does not function adequately to intangible property.").
The Supreme Court held that "interference with copyright does not easily equate with theft,
conversion, or fraud. '4 6 The Court suggested that the aforementioned terms are associated with
"physical removal" rather than with copyright infringement. "There is no dispute in this case that
Dowling's unauthorized inclusion in his bootleg albums or performances of copyrighted
compositions constituted infringement of those copyrights. It is less clear, however, that the
taking that occurs when an infringer abrogates the use of another's protected work comfortably
fits the terms associated with physical removal . . .,47 Thus, in resolving a circuit split as to
whether the National Stolen Property Act applied to interstate shipment of bootlegged musical
recordings, the Court held that, under the rule of lenity, the statute did not apply to Dowling's
conduct.
48
Prosecutors also met a major stumbling block in the prosecution of trade secret theft in
United States v. Brown.49 In Brown, the Tenth Circuit held that the National Stolen Property Act
did not apply to a defendant who had stolen "a computer program in source code form." 50 In
1994, Peter Toren, a trial attorney with the Computer Crime Unit of the Department of Justice's
Criminal Division, observed with some degree of concern that "after the Brown decision, there
are certain situations that a United States Attorney's Office might very well decline to prosecute
under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, even if someone misappropriates an extremely valuable trade secret." 51
Toren recommended that Congress amend the National Stolen Property Act "to specifically
46 Dowling, 473 U.S. at 217.
47 Id.
481d. at 213, 228.
49 United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991).
50 [d. at 1302 ("The United States appeals from a dismissal by the district court of an indictment charging the
defendant.., with three counts of violations of the National Stolen Property Act .... The indictment was dismissed
on the ground that the allegedly stolen property, a computer program in source code form, did not come within the
ambit of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315 as goods, wares or merchandise. We affirm.")
51 Toren, supra note 39, at 96.
include the interstate transportation of stolen intangible property."5 2 He further cited the possible
need for Congress to enact "new comprehensive legislation that criminalizes the theft of trade
secrets."
53
Toren would see his recommendations acted on in October 1996, when the Economic
Espionage Act became effective.5 4 No longer would prosecutors be faced by the limitations of
the National Stolen Property Act. As the first federal statute to criminalize trade secret theft, the
EEA would become a useful tool for federal prosecutors in the decade ahead. The statutory text
of the EEA has nine provisions, two of which define the criminalizing of conduct resulting in the
theft of trade secrets.55 First, § 1831 criminalizes the theft of trade secrets by foreign
governments or foreign-sponsored entities. Second, § 1832 criminalizes the "theft of trade
secrets carried out for economic or commercial advantage, whether the perpetrator is foreign or
domestic. ' 56 Thus, § 1832 applies to cases when an agent of one domestic corporation steals the
trade secrets of his own corporation or of a competitor.
In his signing statement of the EEA, President Clinton reiterated the national security
implications of the statute: "[t]rade secrets are an integral part of virtually every sector of our
economy and are essential to maintaining the health and competitiveness of critical industries
operating in the United States. Economic espionage and trade secret theft threaten our Nation's
national security and economic well-being." (emphasis added)5 7 President Clinton's statement
52 id.
53 Id. at 97 (arguing that a specific federal statute criminalizing the theft of trade secrets would "a strong message
that the theft of trade secrets from American businesses will not be tolerated").
54 Tucker, supra note 1, at 1138.
55 The entire statute is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (1996).
56 Dilworth, supra note 41; see also, Tucker, supra note 1, at 1140-48.
57 PUB. PAPERS 1814-15 (Oct. 11, 1996); see also, Gerald J. Mossinghoff, J. Derek Mason, & David A. Oblon, The
Economic Espionage Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y,
191 (1997) ("The overriding reasons behind the enactment of the legislation were the fully documented efforts of
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that trade secret theft threatens American "national security and economic well-being" should be
read as endorsing the notion that the economic well-being of the United States is a fundamental
component of American national security. Corporate trade secrets, although privately held, are
integral to the financial well being of the American economy, and hence, to that of the American
public.
The EEA is thus a hybrid form of legislation. It serves both as a deterrent to corporate
competitors engaging in the theft of trade secrets and as a form of national security legislation. It
was designed to give federal law enforcement a framework into which prosecutors can fit cases
where a foreign government's intelligence service sought to spy on, and steal trade secrets from,
an American corporation. Of course, an issue may arise as to what is a "trade secret." It is to this
subject that I shall now turn.
C. The Trade Secret Conundrum
Defining a "trade secret" is perhaps not the easiest of tasks. The Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition § 39 defines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an
actual or potential economic advantage over others." 58 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
("UTSA"), adopted by the majority of states, defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
foreign governments to gain access to the trade secrets of U.S. companies, in order to advance the economic
interests of their private sector.").
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
59secrecy.
Prior to the passage of the EEA, the UTSA governed some cases in which competitors or
others misappropriated trade secrets. However, the UTSA is not a criminal statute; rather, it
creates a "cause of action in tort" for the theft of trade secrets. 60 For American Corporation Z to
sue in a state court foreign intelligence service X for the theft of a trade secret likely would be
unworkable for several reasons. 6 1 First, it would likely raise a separation of powers issue, as it
could be interpreted as a state court's intrusion into foreign policy. Second, it is highly unlikely
that a foreign intelligence service, particularly one hostile to the United States, would recognize
the jurisdiction of an American state court. Third, any judgment rendered against a foreign
intelligence agency in a state court would almost certainly never be honored. Furthermore, the
alleged harm done in a cause of action under the UTSA is to the corporation itself rather than to
the public.. Because the EEA is a criminal, rather than a civil, statute, the harm is to society as a
whole, thus giving the federal government authority to prosecute those who engage in trade
secret theft against private American corporations.
The EEA definition of trade secret is similar to that of the UTSA in that the information
"derives independent economic value, actual or potential" from the fact that the general public
does not have readily ascertainable access to the information. However, the definition of what
sorts of information constitute a trade secret is broader in the EEA. Unlike the UTSA, which lists
"a formula, compilation, device, method, technique, or process," the EEA lists "all forms and
types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information . .. .
59 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1-4. Connecticut law defines trade secret identically to that of the UTSA. The statutory
definition is at C.G.S.A. § 35-51(d) (West 2008).
60 Fischer, supra note 41, at 253.
61 But see infra, Part III.A. (discussing how derivative suits might be used to counter economic espionage).
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(emphasis added). One commentator observed that the EEA "actually expands the traditional
view of trade secrets to allocate control and use of other information.'"62 Information, broadly
construed, falls under the purview of the EEA.
Under the EEA, almost any information that the owner takes reasonable steps to keep
secret and which has economic value because of its secret nature is a trade secret. Notable in the
EEA definition is the specific reference to engineering information. Should the engineering trade
secret pertain to the national defense, it would appear that a prosecutor could choose to invoke
either the EEA (engineering factor) or 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), the federal statute criminalizing the
gathering or delivering of defense information to aid a foreign government. The theft of business
proprietary information, by contrast, would most likely be brought under the provisions of the
EEA.
The expansive definition of trade secrets in the EEA has not gone unchallenged. In
United States v. Hsu (Hsu IV), the defendant, Kai-Lo Hsu, contended that the EEA was
unconstitutionally vague. 63 In an indictment under § 1832 of the EEA, Hsu was charged in a FBI
sting operation concerning the theft of technology. Hsu argued "that the definition of 'trade
secret' in 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) offends due process with its vagueness because it does not define
either 'reasonable measures' to keep the information secret, or what is meant by information not
being 'generally known' or 'readily ascertainable' to the public."64 The court was troubled by the
EEA's definition of trade secret. "With the proliferation of the media of communication on
technological subjects, and (still) in so many languages, what is 'generally known' or
62 Leslie G. Berkowitz, Computer Security and Privacy: The Third Wave of Property Law, 33 COLO. LAWYER 57
(Feb. 2004).
63 United States v. Hsu (Hsu IV), 40 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
64 Id. at 626.
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'reasonably ascertainable' to the public at any given time is necessarily never sure." 65 However,
as applied to the facts of that particular case, the court held that the "term 'generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, the public,' is not
unconstitutionally vague." 66 The Hsu court did, however, leave open the door to future
challenges under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
In United States v. Krumrei, also a § 1832 case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming that the definition of trade secret was unconstitutionally vague. 67 In Krumrei, the
government had indicted the defendant for transmitting a trade secret to the owner of a corporate
competitor. The court noted that the defendant knew that the information was proprietary. Citing
Hsu, the Sixth Circuit held that the definition of trade secret in the EEA was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant.
68
Hsu and Krumrei were § 1832 cases rather than § 1831 cases, which deal with economic
espionage intended to benefit a foreign government.. However, the constitutionality of the EEA
definition of trade secret strengthened prosecutors' abilities to apply the EEA toward a more
serious economic espionage crime, foreign-government-sponsored economic espionage against
American corporations. It is to a particular country's extensive efforts at engaging in economic
espionage in the United States to which I shall now turn.
65 [d. at 630.
66 [d.
67 United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001).
68 Id. at 539.
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II. China's Economic War Against the United States
The Chinese Military's Long-Term Strategy
China seeks to be the dominant military power in East Asia.69 In particular, Beijing seeks
to build an offensive naval capability in East Asia and seeks technology that can aid the country
in improving its naval capability.7 0 Such naval capability would be employed in any potential
military confrontation over Taiwan.7 Furthermore, according to two analysts, "Chinese leaders
believe their rule depends on secure sea lanes."7 2 To aid them in this quest, the Chinese
government and its agents have engaged in economic espionage against American institutions
that have critical warship technology.7 3 The Chinese People's Liberation Army also "is in the
midst of a major transformation in order to prepare for what the top leaders call the new era of
information warfare."7 4 China seeks to upgrade its military and industrial base. Ira Winkler
contends that "[i]ndustrial espionage has always played an important role in Chinese economic
development. For many years, China has used its military intelligence capabilities for economic
purposes."
75
69 John J. Tkacik, Jr., Testimony at Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives (July 27, 2005),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/tst072705.cfm.
70 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Analyst's Case Hints at Breadth of Chinese Espionage, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, July 10,
2008, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id- 14402344; James Holmes & Toshi Yoshihara, The
Best Defense is a Good Offense for China's Navy, NAT' INT. (June 2005), available at
http://inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/June / 20 2 0 0 5/June2005HolmesPFV.html; see also, Thomas Harding,
Jitters Over China's Military Muscle, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, September 30, 2008,
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/jitters-over-chinas-military-muscle/2008/09/29/ 1222650990683.html.
71 Neil A. Lewis, Spy Cases Raise Concern on China's Intentions, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008.
72 Holmes & Yoshihara, supra note 72.
73 Press Release, The U. S. Atty's Office, Central Dist. of Cal., Chinese Agent Sentenced to Over 24 Years in Prison
for Exporting U. S. Def. Articles to China (Mar. 24, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2008/032.htm.
74 Cheng Li & Scott W. Harold, China's New Military Elite, CHINA SECURITY VOL.3, NO.4, (2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/fall china-li.aspx?rssid-china.
75 WINKLER, supra note 5, at 86.
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The Chinese government relies heavily upon Chinese scientists and students in the United
States, as well as upon the Chinese-American Diaspora, to spy on American corporations.
76
Unlike the efforts of other countries, the Chinese espionage effort is decentralized. Chinese
students at American universities may be particularly susceptible to approaches from China's
intelligence services.
77
B. Chinese Economic Espionage in the United States
Economic espionage is one of the primary ways by which the Chinese government seeks
to boost its long-term military capability. Due to the seriousness of § 1831 cases, the Attorney
General must authorize local prosecutions. 78 Three years after the passage of the EEA, two
commentators noted that President Clinton's accolades for the statute vastly overstated the
statute's significance and noted that, no prosecutions had been brought under § 183 1.79 However,
at the turn of the century, federal prosecutions brought numerous indictments under § 1831. The
majority of § 1831 cases have involved Chinese-government-sponsored economic espionage. 80
It is these cases, and the interconnections between them, that I shall now discuss.
76 See NICHOLAS EFTIMIADES, CHINESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 28 (1994). China is not the only country to rely
upon ethnic kin in the United States for espionage purposes. See also, WINKLER, supra note 5, at 94 ("Similarly to
the Chinese, the Israelis also utilize ethnic targeting to recruit many of their agents").
77 WINKLER, supra note 5, at 86. None of this, of course, is meant to imply that Chinese-Americans or Chinese
students in the United States should be targets of ethnic profiling.
78 Memorandum from the Office of the Att'y Gen. on Renewal of Approval Requirement Under the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 to all United States Attorneys, all First Assistant United States Attorneys, all Criminal
Chiefs, all Criminal Division Section Chiefs and Office Directors (Mar. 1,2002) (on file with author).
79 John R. Bauer & Joseph F. Savage, Criminalization of Trade Secret Theft: On the Second Anniversary of the
Economic Espionage Act, 8 INT'L TRADE L.J. 59, 59 (1999).
80 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chinese Nat'l Sentenced for Econ. Espionage (June 18, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-545.htm (last accessed Sept. 14, 2008); the first Section 1831
indictment, however, was against two individuals who conspired to aid an instrumentality of the government of
Japan. See Press Release, U.S. Dep. of Justice, U.S. Att'y, N. Dist. of Ohio, First Foreign Econ. Espionage
Indictment; Defendants Steal Trade Secrets from Cleveland Clinic Found. (May 8, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto Serizawalndict.htm; see also, John Mangels, Clinic Case is
First Use of New Law: Statute Aims at Economic Espionage that Benefits a Foreign Government, CLEVELAND
PLAIN DEALER, July 30, 2001, 2001 WL 250929.
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United States v. Fei Ye and Ming Zhong
Given its centrality to the computer and technology industry, Silicon Valley is a focal
point for economic espionage. 81 On November 23, 2001, federal agents arrested Fei Ye and
Ming Zhong at the San Francisco International Airport as they attempted to board a flight to the
PRC with stolen trade secrets in their possession.82 Although both men were originally from
China, Fei Ye was also an American citizen; Ming Zhong was a permanent resident of the
United States. 83 On December 4, 2002, the two men were indicted by a federal grand jury on ten
counts, including conspiracy, economic espionage, possession of stolen trade secrets, and foreign
transportation of stolen property. 84 With regard to the EEA charges, Fei Ye and Ming Zhong
were indicted under both § 1831 and 1832.
Fei Ye and Ming Zhong had engaged in a scheme to steal trade secrets belonging to Sun
Microsystems, Inc. and Transmeta Corporation, as well as two other companies, to develop and
to sell new microprocessors in China. 85 The government's appellate brief to the Ninth Circuit
indicates that the defendants possessed the trade secrets to benefit China by promoting the
development of the Chinese integrated circuit industry through an entity known as
'Supervision. ' 86 According to the indictment, Ye and Zhong had told others that funding for
81 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, N. Dist. of Cal., Two Men Plead Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets from
Silicon Valley Cos. to Benefit China, (Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yePlea.htm.
82 See Brief of Appellant for United States at *5, United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th. Cir. July 5,
2006) (Docket No. CR-02-20145 JW, 2005 WL 5909164).
83 Press Release, U. S. Att'y, N. Dist. of Cal., Pair from Cupertino and San Jose, Cal., Indicted for Econ. Espionage
and Theft of Trade Secrets from Silicon Valley Cos. (Dec. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yelndict.htm.84 [d.
85 See id. According to the government, federal agents seized trade secrets from Transmeta in both Ye's and Zhong's
luggage and seized trade secrets from Sun in Ye's luggage only. Federal agents seized other trade secrets from Sun,
Transmeta, NEC Electronics Corporation, and Trident Microsystems, Inc., in other locations. For the purposes of the
Section 183 1(a)(3), charges, however, all the seized evidence was from the luggage at the airport. For the Section
1831 (a)(5) charge, the location seized included luggage, residences, and Zhong's office.
86 Brief of Appellant for United States at *7, Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (NO. CR-02-20145 JW), 2005 WL 5909164.
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Supervision was being provided by the government of Hangzhou, China; that Supervision was
applying for funding from the 863 Program; and that Supervision was working with a Chinese
university professor, who was helping them to obtain 863 Program funding.87 Run by the PRC
central government and linked to its military, the 863 Program invests in corporations with new
technologies. 88 The FBI suspects, with good reason, that the 863 Program is involved in many
economic espionage cases. 89 Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. Attorney
Kevin J. O'Connor referenced the 863 Program as a "funding plan created and operated by the
government of the People's Republic of China, also known as the national High Technology
Research Development Program." 90 The 863 Program will likewise play a role in the Le case. In
that case, the government referenced the fact that the General Armaments Division of the
People's Liberation Army "had a regular role in, and was a major user, of the 863 Program." 91
According to Larry M. Wortzel, a former military intelligence officer, the 863 Program "is part
of the climate in China that rewards stealing secrets" and the program "is related to state-directed
and economic espionage, but it is only one of the actors."
92
In December 2006, Ye and Zhong pled guilty to the charge of economic espionage to
benefit a foreign government, the first convictions under § 1831. Significantly, this case, like
many federal criminal cases, did not go to trial. However, the question remained as to how
87 Press Release, N. Dist. of Cal., (Dec. 4, 2002), supra note 86.
" K. Oanh Ha, supra note 22.89 [d
90 U.S. Government Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, S.
Hrg. 110-782 (2007) (statement of Kevin J. O'Connor, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut,
Chairman of the Department of J. Task Force on Intellectual Property).
9' Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Bay Men Indicted on Charges of Econ. Espionage, (Sept. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ i Indict.htm.
92 Ariana Eunjung Cha, Even Spies Embrace China's Free Market, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at D1.
208
extensive the Chinese government's involvement in the Ye case really was.93 The EEA does not
require that prosecutors prove that a foreign government or entity needed to be involved, directly
or indirectly, in the theft of trade secrets. Rather, what is required is for a person or organization
to act in such a way that will benefit a foreign government or entity. Congress likely settled upon
this language for two practical reasons. First, it would be much more difficult for a prosecutor to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a foreign intelligence service aided or encouraged the acts
by a hypothetical principal in an economic espionage case. Second, because of the sensitive
nature of counterintelligence operations, the government would be unlikely to want to advertise
directly that a foreign government, especially an ally like France or Israel, was caught engaging
in economic espionage against American corporations.
94
In the Ye case, however, because of the Chinese connection, prosecutors likely felt that
the guilty pleas of both men would serve to deter potential further Chinese-sponsored economic
espionage activities. At the very least, the first § 1831 conviction involving a Chinese connection
would serve as a validation of the Congressional intent to enact the EEA. The Ye case would,
however, be only the first in a string of cases all involving a Chinese connection and all
occurring in California.
United States v. Xiodong Sheldon Meng
In December 2006, in a 36-count criminal indictment, the government indicted a
Chinese-Canadian, Xiodang Sheldon Meng, under § 1831 of the EEA and under the Arms
93 Jordan Robertson, A Victory Against Economic Espionage, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 16, 2006, 2006 WL 21887869
("[T]he settlement leaves unanswered one of the key underlying questions of the case: Did the Chinese government
or any of its officials know the trade secrets were stolen?").
94 See WINKLER, supra note 5, at 104 ("Although relatively few Israeli espionage cases hit the media, it is extremely
likely that Israel is every bit as active in this arena as are the French and the Chinese.").
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Control Export Act, as well as other ancillary charges. 95 From June 19, 2000, to March 7, 2003,
Meng, of Cupertino, California, was employed at a San Jose, California company, Quantum3D,
Inc.9 6 He later pled guilty to misappropriating trade secrets, including a product known as
nVSensor, a corporate night-vision technology product used exclusively in military applications
for training and simulation applications. 97 The government alleged that Meng intended his
actions to benefit the PRC Navy Research Center in Beijing.98 The defense, in court documents,
maintained that Meng did not engage in espionage on behalf of a foreign government.
99
According to Joseph P. Russoniello, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
California, "[i]n this case, a Silicon Valley trade secret was used in a demonstration project in
Beijing with the intent to Benefit the PRC Naval Research Center."'100 The investigation also
indicated that Meng used the military application trade secrets in a demonstration and in a sales
proposal to the Malaysian Air Force and the Thai Air Force. 1 1 However, according to Assistant
U.S. Attorney Mark Krotoski, who prosecuted the case, "it was Meng's focus on profits, not a
foreign allegiance, that drove him to steal the trade secrets and to try to sell them to the highest
95 Tom Abate & John Cot6, Silicon Valley Espionage Case: Feds Accuse Man of Trying to Sell Software to Asian
Military Buyers, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 2006, at Al, WL 21800509. The Arms Control Export Act is at 22 U.S.C. §
2778 (2004).
96 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U. S. Att'y, N. Dist. of Cal., Former Chinese Nat'l Charged with Stealing
Military Application Trade Secrets from Silicon Valley Firm to Benefit Gov'ts of Thail., Malay., and China (Dec.
14, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengCharge.htm.
97 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Chinese Nat'l Sentenced for Econ. Espionage, supra note 80; Cupertino Resident
Pleads Guilty to Espionage Charges, SILICON VALLEY SAN JOSE Bus. J. (Aug. 2, 2007), WL 14842694.
98 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Chinese Nat' Sentenced for Economic Espionage, supra note 80("...
With the Intent To Benefit China Navy Research Center").
99 John Cote, Salesman Sentenced to 2 Years in Prison as Industrial Spy, Thief S.F. CHRON., June 18, 2008, at B3,.
WL 11527279.




1Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney, Northern District of California, Former
Chinese National Charged with Stealing Military Application Trade Secrets from Silicon Valley Firm to Benefit
Governments of Thailand, Malaysia, and China (Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/mengCharge.htm.
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bidder."' 102 The Justice Department, however, emphasized the national security dimension to the
Meng case with a specific press release from the National Security Division.
10 3
As in the Ye case, the question remains as to how extensive was the Chinese
government's role. Was the Meng case primarily a theft-of-trade-secrets case, a
counterintelligence case, or both? If it was primarily a theft-of-trade-secrets case, then § 1831 of
the EEA proved to be an adequate statutory provision. However, despite the relative seriousness
of the offense, Meng was sentenced to only two years in prison, a comparatively light sentence
given that § 1831 allows for up to 15 years imprisonment. 10 4
Categorizing Meng as primarily a counterintelligence case utilizing the EEA makes more
sense because of the connection to the PRC Naval Research Center. Had this case occurred
during the Cold War and involved the Soviet Navy, prosecutors would have brought this case
under the Espionage Act. 10 5 Indeed the case, at least theoretically, meets the statutory provision
of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), which makes it a crime to communicate to the "naval force within a
foreign country . . . any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information
relating to the national defense ... ,106 The statutory language noticeably does not refer to trade
secrets; however, it does refer to "information relating to the national defense.' This phrase is
probably broad enough to encompass the night-vision technology trade secret. However, the
statutory language of the EEA has the advantage of being more precise. The best explanation of
why the government chose to prosecute Meng under the EEA rather than under the Espionage
102 Engineer Who Tried to Sell Secrets to China Gets 24 Months, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 19, 2008, WL 11538443.
103 See http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-545.html.
104 See Cot6, supra note 99..
105 See supra, notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
10' 18 U.S.C. § 794(a).
Act is that the government likely did not want to disclose any information obtained during the
investigation of Chinese intelligence operations. Such information might have had to be revealed
in court had the prosecutors chosen to bring the case under the Espionage Act and had Meng
chosen to go to trial. Nevertheless, with a plea agreement in a § 1831 case, the government was
able to send a strong message that Chinese-sponsored theft of trade secrets in Silicon Valley
would be discovered and prosecuted. As the following case will show, the interconnections
between the Silicon Valley cases should not be underestimated.
United States v. Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge
On September 26, 2007, the Department of Justice announced the indictment of Lan Lee
("Lan Li"), an American citizen, of Palo Alto, California, and Yufei Ge, a Chinese national, of
San Jose, on charges of economic espionage. 107 The U.S. Attorney's Office brought the charges
under both § 1831 and § 1832.108 The superseding indictment alleged that Lee and Ge conspired
to steal trade secrets from their employer, NetLogics Microsystem, and from Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation. The indictment also alleged that the men created a
company, SICO Microsystems, Inc., registered in Delaware, "for the purpose of developing and
marketing products derived from and using the stolen trade secrets." 109 The men allegedly stole
blueprints that they intended to use to reproduce a super-fast microchip in China.
110
Similar to the Ye case, the 863 Program played a role in the Lee case as well."' In 2003,
SICO signed a deal with a Chinese company run by venture capitalist Liu Baisen, who allegedly
107 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Bay Area Men Indicted on Charges of Econ. Espionage, (Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/lildict.htm.
108 Id.
109 Id.
l10 Cha, supra note 92.
See supra, notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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agreed to secure funding from the 863 Program and the General Armaments Department. 112 In
the Department of Justice press release, the government explicitly referenced both the Chinese
government and the 863 Program. "The defendants sought to obtain venture capital funding for
their company from the government of China, in particular the 863 Program and the General
Armaments Department." 113 The government also specifically singled out the 863 Program's ties
with the Chinese military-industrial complex: "[lt]he program was designed by leading PRC
scientists to develop and encourage the creation of technology in the PRC and focused on issues
such as high technology communications and laser technology, with an emphasis on military
applications." 114 According to one press report, Lee and Ge "allegedly reached out to Chinese
government agencies for help funding the business, including a branch of the Chinese military
responsible for the development of weapons systems, and an agency that funnels money toward
technology companies with a military bent." 115 The Lee case represents the intersection of trade
secret theft and national security. Indeed, Lee is exactly the type of case that prompted Congress
to enact § 1831. Here, a Chinese national working for a California employer allegedly stole trade
secrets intended to benefit the PRC. Making the case even more threatening to national security
was the linkage to the 863 Program.
The Lee case should not be seen in a vacuum, but rather in the context of a systematic
effort by individuals in California to steal trade secrets that would benefit China. Levine has
postulated that the Department of Justice has, in economic espionage cases, "an apparent strategy
of trading sentencing leniency for one pair of defendants in order to help convict another pair on
112 Cha, Even Spies Embrace, infra note 126.
113 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Two Bay Area Men Indicted on Charges of Economic Espionage, supra
note 107.
114 Id.
115 Two Engineers Indicted in Economic Espionage, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, 2007 WL 18923968.
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higher-profile charges .. ,,116 Here, Levine specifically references the apparent ties between the
Ye and Lee cases. He hints that in Ye and Zhong's plea agreement with the government, the two
men provided information to the U.S. Attorney's Office that was then utilized to indict Lee and
Ge for economic espionage. "Ye and Zhong's plea deal doesn't specify who they gave up, but
they admitted to applying for funding from the same Chinese venture group that Lee and Ge had
allegedly solicited." ' 1 7 Although there is no mention of venture capitalist Liu in the publicly-
available Ye documents, such a linkage would suggest that Liu may have been a conduit between
the defendants and the 863 Program. According to the Washington Post, "[o]ne of the four
addresses listed in Liu's former company's official registration papers is a room in the basement
of a heavily guarded, unmarked government security complex in Beijing's Zhongguancun
neighborhood, which is known as China's Silicon Valley." 118 As of now, the Lee case raises
more questions about the interconnections between the different California economic espionage
cases than answers.
United States v. Dongfan "Greg" Chung
Although the Department of Justice did not arrest Greg Chung until February 2008, in
many respects the Chung case began in 1985 when Chi Mak and his wife became naturalized
citizens in Los Angeles. 119 Described by federal prosecutors as the "perfect sleeper agent,"
Chinese-born Chi Mak arrived in the United States in the 1970s and built a career working for a
defense contractor, Power Paragon, in an effort to develop a submarine propulsion system.120 His
116 Dan Levine, DOJ's Economic-Spy Strategy Emerges, May 5, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id 1202421126406.
1 1 7 
id.
118 Cha, supra note 92.
119 Peter Grier, Spy Case Patterns the Chinese Style of Espionage, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 30, 2005.
120 Joby Warrick & Carrie Johnson, Chinese Spy 'Slept' in U.S. for 2 Decades, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2008, at Al.
214
job and security clearance gave him access to Navy ship, submarine, and weapons technology. 12 1
In 2003, federal authorities began investigating Mak. The FBI discovered that Mak had copied
thousands of technical documents onto computer disks which he then arranged to be sent to
China. 122
Mak admitted that he had been placed in the United States to steal defense-industrial
secrets. Mak was allegedly handled by "PRC official A," a senior Chinese intelligence official
who was the mastermind in United States v. Bergersen. In Bergersen, a Department of Defense
weapons system analyst pled guilty in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, to conspiracy
to disclose national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 793(d) and (g). 123 Notably, the Justice Department announced the charges against
Bergersen on the very same day as they announced charges against Chung.
124
On October 28, 2005, federal agents arrested Chi Mak, his wife, and his brother. 125 A
federal jury convicted Mak of both illegally exporting American defense technology and being
an unregistered foreign agent.126 Mak was eventually sentenced to 293 months in federal prison
for exporting technical information about Navy warship technologies and sensitive American




123 Lewis, supra note 71; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Defense Dep't Official Pleads Guilty to Espionage
Charge Involving China, (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08 nsd 252.html.
124 Jerry Markon, Defense Qfficial is Charged in Chinese Espionage Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2008, at Al.
125 Warrick & Johnson, supra.
126 Jury Convicts Chinese-Born Engineer of Passing U.S. Military Secrets to China, Associated Press, May 10,
2007, available at http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlystory/0,3566,271325,00.html.
127 Press Release, U. S. Att'ys Office, Central Dist. of Cal., supra note 73.
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The Mak case is linked with the Chung case. 128 As previously described, on February 11,
2008, federal agents arrested Dongfan "Greg" Chung of Orange, California, on economic
espionage charges. 12 9 Unlike some of the previous cases where prosecutors brought charges
under both §§ 1831 and 1832, here, the economic espionage charges in the indictment were
solely under § § 1831 (a)(1) and 1831(3). 130 The October 2007 Grand Jury indictment alleges that
Chung conspired to steal possess Boeing trade secrets intended to benefit the PRC or its
agents.13 1 Chung allegedly took Boeing trade secrets relating to the Space Shuttle, a military
transport aircraft, and the Delta IV rocket. 132 The indictment is explicit in asserting a direct
connection between Chung and the Chinese government. "Defendant received requests from
officials of the PRC to provide American technology to the PRC.' 33
The indictment alleges that Gu Weihao of the PRC's Ministry of Aviation wrote Chung a
letter dated May 2, 1987, asking Chung for "assistance on technical issues" for various aviation
programs. 134 The letter also suggested cover stories for Chung's travel to China. 13 More
interesting, however, is a letter from Gu Weihao dated April 12, 1988, in which Weihao "stated
that Chi Mak's wife, Rebecca, was in China and had told Gu that the Maks and Chungs had a
good relationship."' 136 Gu Weihao also wrote "that it was faster and safer to send information
through Chi Mak.', 137 Although the indictment does not provide further detail on the relationship
128 Press Release, U. S. Att'ys Office, Central Dist. of Cal., Former Boeing Eng'r Charged with Econ. Espionage in
Theft of Space Shuttle Secrets, (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pressroom/pr2008/01 1.html.
129 Id.
130 United States v. Chung, Indictment, February Feb. 6, 2008, at 1. (copy on file with author).
131 Id. at 7.
132 Press Release, U.S. Att'ys Office, Central Dist. of Cal., Former Boeing Eng'r Charged with Econ. Espionage in
Theft of Space Shuttle Secrets, supra note 128.
133 United States v. Chung at 8.
134 Id. at 15.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 16.
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between the Maks and the Chungs, one can infer that Chi Mak and Greg Chung had an ongoing
relationship relating to their mutual espionage activities.
The Chung case is best viewed as a turning point in the government's approach to
prosecuting economic espionage cases in which there was a Chinese connection. In contrast to
the Ye, Meng, and Lee cases, where the references to an official Chinese governmental role were
not nearly as explicit, in Chung, the Government likely felt confident enough not only to
publicize an official Chinese governmental role in a § 1831 case, but also to provide clues as to
the linkages between Chung and both Mak and Bergersen. The case also demonstrates how bold
the Chinese government has been in planting agents in the United States and in stealing
American trade secrets that could benefit its military-industrial complex.
Given the escalating threat to American national security of economic espionage, it is
worth considering whether federal criminal law is an appropriate mechanism for countering the
Chinese military's long-term strategy. Congress should consider modifying the EEA to counter
what appears to be a rising, concentrated effort by the PRC to pilfer American military
technology. It is to that subject that I shall now turn.
III. The EEA and the Problem of Chinese Espionage
Although the EEA has only been in existence for over a decade, it is not too soon to
attempt a critical assessment of § 1831 and its role in combating Chinese-government-sponsored
economic espionage in the United States. The § 1831 cases where there was a connection to the
Chinese government provide a good basis upon which to begin such an assessment. Because
many of the documents in the cases remain sealed, providing a comprehensive picture of the role
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of U.S. Attorney's offices in investigating and prosecuting economic espionage crimes remains
difficult. Furthermore, in some ways the cases provide more questions than answers. However,
in light of the information that is publicly available, I offer three primary assessments of the role
of the EEA in combating Chinese economic espionage.
First, the EEA alone cannot solve the problem. While the EEA has proved to be both a
necessary and useful tool to prosecute actors who engage in economic espionage on behalf of the
Chinese government or with the intent to benefit the PRC, federal criminal law is limited in what
it can do to solve the overarching problem of U.S.-Chinese economic and military
competition. 13 Here, the problem is not the "overexpansion of federal criminal law," 139 but
whether economic espionage is also a diplomatic problem. Furthermore, it must be noted that
there is also a role for private lawsuits in countering Chinese economic espionage.
Second, Congress properly defined economic espionage as the theft of trade secrets and
properly defined trade secrets broadly. This has allowed for federal prosecutors to apply the
statute in myriad cases where the mail and wire fraud statutes did not apply. Furthermore, the
broad, inclusive definition of trade secrets in the EEA makes certain that those who engage in
economic espionage to benefit the Chinese government cannot mount a successful defense by
contending that the materials they were charged with misappropriating were not trade secrets.
Third, in light of the overarching national security threat posed by trade secret theft,
Congress should enhance the penalties for those § 1831 crimes where the defendant's acts are
139 John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes,
54 AM. U. L. REv. 545, 547 (2005). Although even Baker, a critic of the expansion of federal criminal law, seems to
note that the EEA is not necessarily such an example of overexpansion of federal criminal law, as the EEA protects
"special economic interests."
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intended to benefit a foreign government's military or military-industrial complex. Although this
enhancement likely would not serve as a deterrent to ideologically committed agents of a foreign
power, it would signal the fact that Congress is taking the threat seriously. This would give
prosecutors greater leeway to make deals with defendants to obtain useful information regarding
ongoing espionage in the United States.
A. The EEA Alone Cannot Solve the Problem of Chinese Economic Espionage
When Congress passed the EEA in 1996, it was not clear whether any legislators had
China specifically in mind. In the Senate hearings prior to the enactment of the EEA, perhaps
with diplomatic protocol in mind, no senator specifically referenced China. However, China's
rise as an economic competitor and its history of espionage activities were known in the
intelligence community. It is just as likely that legislators were as concerned with economic
espionage conducted by friendly countries such as France and Israel. However, in light of the
fact that the overwhelming number of § 1831 criminal prosecutions have had a Chinese
connection, the best assessment of the efficacy of § 1831 of the EEA must be determined with
reference to those cases that prosecutors chose to bring in court. It should be noted, however, that
just because prosecutors have chosen to bring charges against Chinese persons it does not mean
that federal law enforcement has not discovered numerous cases of the French and Israelis
engaging in similar conduct. Because of the negative diplomatic and political repercussions of
bringing legal charges against agents of friendly powers, it is possible that acts of the French and
Israelis have been dealt with quietly, outside the formalities of the American legal system.
Although prosecutors have been successful in combating PRC-sponsored economic
espionage in the United States, the problem of Chinese economic espionage is not purely one for
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federal law enforcement. Unlike domestic trade secret theft where federal law enforcement
should have exclusive jurisdiction, trade secret theft where Chinese agents steal American
defense technology has implications for U.S.-Chinese economic, military, and political relations.
Indeed, the problem of Chinese-sponsored economic espionage cannot be so easily separated
from the numerous areas of tension between the United States and China, ranging from disputes
over currency 4 °, China's rising influence in Africa 141 , and climate change. 42
Diplomacy must play a preeminent role in any effort to deal with the problem of Chinese
economic espionage in a comprehensive manner. The U.S. Ambassador to China, for instance,
may express concerns about Chinese economic espionage to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Such
conversations would demonstrate that the United States considers economic espionage as much
of a diplomatic problem as a legal one. Indeed, the United States could link the problem of
economic espionage to wider concerns about China's long-term military intentions and quietly
create a deal in which China would agree to end its economic espionage in return for American
concessions in some area that Beijing considers vital to China's national interests. Furthermore,
diplomats would have the luxury of creating a grand bargain outside the formalities of the
American legal system. Such an approach would be proactive, rather than the reactive approach
of the EEA.
Corporations themselves should be required to ensure that their trade secrets, particularly
those that have national security value, are not stolen. One commentator has cited the threat of a
141 Joe McDonald, US, China headed for possible currency clash, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 3, 2008.
141 Craig Simons, China's Influence Among African Nations Spurs Concerns, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 30, 2008
(noting that China is the biggest purchaser of oil from Sudan).
142 China to Work With Obama's National Security Team, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2008.
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foreign power, such as China, planting information-gathering technology into commercial and
industrial products sold in the United States and used by U.S. government agencies. 143 Robert
Bracknell, citing the threat of technological espionage specifically from China, organized crime,
and terrorists, has argued that the law, borrowing from the American legal concept of products
liability, "can impose special duties on companies engaged in information technology commerce
aimed at U.S. consumers, including the U.S. government, and can require them to take prudent
steps mandated by law to ensure that the products they sell are as 'espionage-safe' as
possible."'144 Although Bracknell was concerned about the potential of a foreign government to
deliberately place information seeking technology in exports, his notion of having private actors
involved in counterespionage merits attention. Indeed, although I have previously cautioned
against the practicality of American corporations bringing suit against foreign intelligence
agencies in state courts14 , there is, nevertheless, a role for private actors in combating Chinese
economic espionage.
Here, the case of In re Caremark is instructive. In Caremark, the Delaware Court of
Chancery noted that corporate boards may have a duty to maintain a nominal internal control and
reporting system that would keep track of possibly illegal acts by employees, so as to avoid
liability under the duty of care. 146 The court held that "a director's obligation includes a duty to
attempt in good faith that a corporate information and reporting system, which the board,
concludes is adequate exists" and that a failure to do so could result in liability. 147 The court's
143 Robert Gray Bracknell, Trust Not Their Presents, Nor Admit the Horse: Countering the Technologically-Based
Espionage Threat, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 832 (2007).
144 Id. at 840.
145 See supra Part I.C.
146 In re: Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
147 Id. at 970.
holding in Caremark could equally be applied to public corporations whose employees engage in
economic espionage to benefit a foreign power.
In order to ensure that public corporations are safeguarding trade secrets from foreign
spies, courts should permit shareholders of public corporations to file derivative suits on behalf
of those corporations that had trade secrets stolen by persons intending to benefit a foreign
power. The potential of a lawsuit would give incentives to corporate directors and officers to
make sure that they did proper background checks of all employees and that they had internal
reporting mechanisms to properly identify potential espionage. Furthermore, allowing such
derivative suits to go forward would cause shareholders of public corporations to be more aware
of the threat of economic espionage and to apply pressure upon corporations to ensure that there
are adequate internal safeguards for detecting espionage.
B. Congress Properly Defined Economic Espionage
When it enacted the EEA, Congress had to decide what would constitute "economic
espionage"; it chose to define economic espionage in terms of the theft of trade secrets.
148
Congress chose an expansive definition, one that did not go unchallenged under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine. 149 That said, federal prosecutors in California have been able to utilize the
definitions of "economic espionage" and "trade secrets" to successfully inhibit the
misappropriation of trade secrets, many of which had vital national security implications. 1
50
Congress could have adopted Canadian intelligence's definition of economic espionage
as pertaining to a foreign government's attempt "to gain unauthorized access to economic
148 See supra, Part I.A.
149 Supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
150 See supra Part l.B.
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intelligence, such as proprietary information or technology, for economic advantage."'' Here,
the Canadian intelligence service's definition defines economic espionage, not without reason, as
seeking economic advantage. However, as the Chung case, where the defendant stole Navy
technology, demonstrates, economic advantage narrowly construed may not always be the
motivating factor in "economic espionage" cases. Indeed, the economic advantage factor may be
ancillary to a foreign power's long-term military strategy. 152 Furthermore, although Canadian
intelligence's definition referenced proprietary information, it does not reference "trade secrets."
The definition of economic espionage in the EEA as the theft of trade secrets has made
the EEA a successful tool for prosecuting trade secret theft intended to benefit a foreign power.
The definition of trade secrets was broad enough to include such disparate technologies as night-
vision technology, blueprints, and Navy weapons technology. 153 Prosecutors, however, should be
aware that the broad definition of trade secrets in the EEA does mean that a defendant with a
savvy defense counsel could advance a constitutional vagueness challenge where the technology
in question may not be completely unknown to the public. 15
4
The House Committee on the Judiciary report on the terminology of the EEA, for
instance, noted that "[Lt]he term 'trade secret' is defined in the bill to include all types of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, whether tangible
or intangible, and regardless of the means by which the information is stored, compiled, or
memorialized."' 155 Notably absent from the Committee's definition, however, is the adjective
"military." However, as the Chung case demonstrates, prosecutors are willing to utilize the EEA
151 Supra note 28.
152 Supra Part II.A.
153 Cf United States v. Hsu (Hsu IV), 40 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
114 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839-3 (1996).
155 H.R. REP. No. 104-788 (1996), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021,4022.
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to prosecute persons who engage in the theft of trade secrets with direct military value. 156 In
Chung, the trade secrets were in the form of technical documents on computer disks, within the
definition set forth by the Judiciary Committee report.
C. Congress Should Enhance the Criminal Penalties for Economic Espionage
Congress should enhance the statutory penalties for a specific subset of § 1831 EEA
crimes, namely when a defendant steals a trade secret with the intent to benefit a foreign
government's military-industrial complex. Currently, the maximum statutory penalty for all
completed § 1831 crimes, where a defendant steals a trade secret to benefit a foreign
government, is fifteen years of imprisonment and a fine of $500,000.157 The statute does not
distinguish between friendly and hostile foreign governments or between foreign governments,
in general, and foreign militaries, more specifically. In light of the national security implications
of trade secret theft when the trade secrets in question could confer a benefit on a military
adversary, Congress should revise the statutory penalties for completed § 1831 crimes and enact
a higher statutory term of imprisonment.
Congress has already distinguished between cases of trade secret theft when a foreign
government is implicated and when it is not. In contrast to § 1831 crimes that have a statutory
maximum of fifteen years of imprisonment, completed § 1832 crimes, when a foreign entity is
not benefited, have a statutory maximum of ten years of imprisonment. 158 The difference in the
statutory mandatory maximum sentence reflects "the more serious nature of economic espionage
156 See supra, notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
117 See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (1996).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1996).
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sponsored by a foreign government."' 59 Both § 1831 and § 1832 require criminal forfeiture. 160
The forfeiture of proceeds is mandatory. 161 However, the forfeiture of instrumentalities is
discretionary. 162 Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the base offense level for both completed
§ 1831 and § 1832 crimes is determined by U.S.S.G. § 2B1.163 Here, because the statutory
maximum penalties for §§ 1831 and 1832, respectively, are fifteen and ten years, the base
offense level is six years. 164 An enhanced criminal penalty for § 1831 crimes should have an
increased offense level. By enhancing the statutory penalty for § 1831 crimes, Congress would
be signaling that it takes very seriously the increased threat that economic espionage poses to
American national security.
Because the EEA covers the theft of trade secrets, § 1831 crimes are subject to the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 ("'MRA"). 165 The MVRA applies to convictions
relating to crimes such as "an offense against property under this title ... including any offense
committed by fraud or deceit."' 166 According to the Department of Justice, the theft of trade
secrets meets the § 3663A definition of property. "The misappropriation of trade secrets is
essentially the theft of property.' ' 167 While the Justice Department is correct to characterize trade
secrets as a form of property, its contention that the misappropriation of trade secrets is akin to
the theft of property merits further analysis. However, in § 1831 crimes where the agent of a
foreign government steals a trade secret from American Corporation C to benefit the military-
159 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section, 171 PROSECUTING IP CRIMES MANUAL,
available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/04ipma.html.
160 See 18 U.S.C. § 1834 (1996).161 8 U.S.C. § 1834(a)(1) (1996).
162 18 U.S.C. § 1834(a)(2) (1996).
163 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Computer Crime & Intellectual Prop. Section, 266 PROSECUTING IP CRIMES MANUAL,
available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/O8ipma.html
164 Id.
161 8 U.S.C. § 3663A. (2000)
166 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii); see also, PROSECUTING I P CRIMES MANUAL at 172.
167 PROSECUTING IP CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 171, at 172.
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industrial complex of the foreign government, what has occurred is not merely the theft of
property; a national security crime has also occurred. Because of the potential threat to national
security, such crimes should have enhanced criminal penalties as a way of deterring future
conduct.
According to the Department of Justice manual, "[t]he defendant's sentence is driven
largely by the value of the misappropriated property."'168 In § 1832 cases of corporate trade secret
theft, value, narrowly construed, can be determined in terms of the fair market value of the stolen
trade secret or in terms of the potential value of the trade secret, such as a vaccine, to the
corporation in the future. An independent appraisal could determine the latter value with relative
accuracy and would focus primarily on economic indicators. However, as Marc Zwillinger and
Christian Genetski have noted in their work on calculating loss under the EEA, "as various
courts have recognized, determining the fair market value of the trade secret is not the ultimate
goal in the sentencing process. The purpose of the Guidelines is to achieve sentences that
accurately reflect the relative culpability of offenders in a consistent, uniform, and proportional
manner." 169 In § 1831 cases in which there are direct national security implications for the
misappropriated trade secrets, culpability is increased by the increased threat to national security
and that value has more than a fair market value monetary component. Value must be determined
not only by the fair market value of the trade secret and the resulting loss to the corporation, but
also by the national security value. The national security value should be determined
independent of the monetary value of the trade secret.
168 PROSECUTING IP CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 171, at 266.
169 Marc J. Zwillinger & Christian S. Genetski, Calculating Loss Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9
GEO. MASON L. REV. 323, 352 (2000).
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Quantifying a national security value of a trade secret would prove difficult, in
comparison to determining the fair market value of a corporate trade secret such as a vaccine or
software. However, given that a defendant's sentence is driven largely by the value of the
property, the concept of value in completed § 1831 crimes should be expanded to include not just
monetary value as defined by loss to the corporation, but also the increased threat to national
security. Here, Halkins v. Helms is instructive. 170 In Helms, the court, in a Freedom of
Information Act case, referred to the "national security value of information."' 17 1 Here, national
security value in determining the proper application of a statute. In terms of the EEA, I have
argued that Congress should amend the statutory maximum penalty for § 1831 crimes so that it
includes a heightened maximum term of imprisonment to recognize, national security value.
IV. A New Frontier of Espionage: Hacking and Cyberwarfare
Hacking as the New Warfare
China's economic warfare against the United States and its allies is no longer limited to
the theft of trade secrets. Computer hacking is the newest form of warfare employed by the
Chinese government. 172 In the 1980s, "hacking" was done by small groups of technologically
sophisticated individuals as a means of learning more about computers. 173 In the following
decade, computers, email, and the Internet had become synonymous with modern business.
Indeed, a March 2008 Pentagon report concluded that China's development of ways to infiltrate
and to manipulate worldwide computer networks was "a new and potentially dangerous military
170 Halkins v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
171 Id. at 996.
172 See, e.g, Rhys Blakely, Jonathan Richards, James Rossiter, & Richard Beeston, M5 Alert on China's
Cyberspace Spy Threat, TIMES (London), Dec. 1, 2007. Because much of the evidence on alleged Chinese hacking is
classified, the best source for material on Chinese hacking and cyber warfare primarily comes from news reports.
173 WINKLER, supra note 5, at 75.
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capability."' 174 A report by the U.S. Commission on Cybersecurity urged then President-elect
Obama to create a Center for Cybersecurity Operations and to have a White House advisor
oversee this new quasi-agency. 175 As of late December 2008, Mr. Obama was considering
creating an office for cybersecurity as part of a general overhaul of U.S. intelligence agencies.
176
Britain's M15 intelligence service has stated that Chinese state organizations have
conducted cyber espionage against British banks and financial services firms and that the
Chinese Army was using the Internet to steal trade secrets from British companies doing
business in China. 177 China was also suspected of a cyber attack on the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. 178 In November 2008, the Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese hackers had
gained access to a "significant number of unclassified White House emails."' 179 Just days later,
Fox News reported that the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") computer system had been
attacked by hackers. 180 Although authorities found no culprit, speculation centered on the
Chinese. Even the Obama and McCain presidential campaigns were hacked; the Chinese were
primary suspects. 181 According to John Tkacik, a former intelligence analyst, President-elect
Obama will be presented with a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report highlighting
extensive Chinese cyber espionage.1
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174 Julian Barnes with Ching-Ching Ni, Chinese Hacking Worries Pentagon, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A9.
175 Keith Epstein, U.S. is Losing Global Cyberwar, Commission Says, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 7, 2008,
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The term 'cyber espionage' merits close attention. One must remember that when
Congress passed the EEA in 1996, the United States had yet to enter the dot.com boom of the
late 1990s; computers were not yet fully part of everyday American life. Thus Congress chose to
criminalize the theft of trade secrets in its definition of economic espionage. Today, economic
espionage need not be conducted by individuals in a particular locale, clandestinely working for
the Chinese government within the physical locale of an American corporation. 183 The Chinese
government and its agents may be hacking into American computer systems directly from China
or from other locations in or outside the United States. 184 According to Winkler, foreign
intelligence agencies rely on the wider hacker community to hide many of their crimes. 185 Thus,
Chinese intelligence agencies may be able to misappropriate trade secrets from American
corporations without ever having agents physically set foot in any corporate offices.
Cyber espionage refers to both the theft of trade secrets through hacking or hacking
designed to disrupt fundamentally the cyber infrastructure of a state or vital components of its
economy. The Pentagon has claimed that the Chinese military has viruses designed to attack
enemy computer systems.18 6 Indeed, American officials are concerned that China is employing
cyberspace not only for espionage, but also to prepare for a hot war over Taiwan. 187 Hacking
may also play a greater role in hot wars. During the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, Russian
hackers successfully brought down Georgian governmental and media websites. 188 Although
these attacks played no determinative role in the conflict and may have come from Russian
activists rather than from Moscow, they served as a wake-up call for governments.
183 See supra, Part II.B.
184 For a discussion of the difficulty of tracing cyber attacks during the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, see Andrew
Gray, REUTERS, Georgia Hacking Stirs Fears of Cyber Militias, Sept. 1, 2008.
185 WINKLER supra note 5.
186 Behar, supra note 184.187 Cybersecurity: Beware the Trojan Panda, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, 2007 WL 17415933.
188 Grey, supra note 184.
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According to Air Force Gen. Gene Renuart, of U.S. Northern Command, a looming
problem is that no one has "defined what would constitute an act of war in cyberspace."'
189
Writing in the late 1990s, John J. Fialka argued for "a coherent, modern body of criminal law
that deters economic espionage" and contended that the EEA was a good start. 190 In light of the
myriad challenges posed by Chinese hacking, Congress should consider passing comprehensive
legislation aimed at both preventing and punishing those individuals who actively engage in, or
aid those who engage in, cyber espionage against American governmental facilities or
corporations. The EEA provides a model for such legislation.
The EEA Provides a Modelfor Comprehensive Cyber Espionage Legislation
In 1996, when Congress held hearings on the threat posed by economic espionage, the
Internet was still in its infancy. Now, as American national security is imperiled by hacking and
cyber espionage, Congress should conduct both public and closed hearings on the threat posed
by hacking, particularly hacking sponsored or directed by foreign governments. Such hearings
would follow up on the US-China Economic and Security Review commission's 2008 annual
report to Congress. That report concluded China is likely to take advantage of American cyber
space because "the costs of cyber operations are low in comparison with traditional espionage or
military activities [and because] determining the origin of cyber operations and attributing them
to the Chinese government or any other operator is difficult."'191 Full Congressional hearings
should include representatives from both American government and industry. Intelligence
officials and think-tank analysts should also contribute to Congressional hearings that would
both warn Americans of the threat posed by cyber espionage and send a signal to the Chinese
189 Id.
190 FIALKA, supra note 6, at 206.
191 http://www.uscc.gov/annual report/2008/EXECUTIVE%/ 20SUMMARY.pdf., p. 9.
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government that the United States is willing to devote significant resources into countering
hacking directed against America's critical economic and military infrastructure. 192 Congress
should use these hearings as an impetus to enact new, comprehensive legislation to counter cyber
espionage.
The primary federal statute that criminalizes hacking is 18 U.S.C. § 1030, which
criminalizes fraud and related activity in connection with computers. 193 The statute criminalizes
the unauthorized access of a computer and the disclosure of information obtained by such access.
Section 1030(a) specifically criminalizes acts where an individual illegally accesses a computer
to obtain information that could be used to the advantage of a foreign government. 194 This
statute, by its plain language, could be used to prosecute those persons caught hacking into
American government computers to access information intended to benefit a foreign
government. In light of the massive wave of both government-sponsored and independent cyber
attacks that have occurred in recent years, and because of the specific threat posed by alleged
Chinese hacking, Congress should pass new legislation directly aimed at countering cyber
espionage.
This new legislation should be known as the CEA or Cyber Espionage Act. It would
specifically criminalize acts of hacking intended to disrupt American economic or military
192 See, e.g., Mike Mount, Report: China Trying to Crack U.S. Computers, Buy Nukes, Mar. 3, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/03/03/pentagon.china/index.html.
193 See http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030NEW.htm.
194 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) reads in full: "having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the
United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of
section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used
to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers,
transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or
cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully
retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it."
computer infrastructure, military secrets, or trade secrets. The term 'hacking' should be broadly
defined, much as "trade secrets" was in the EEA. This would allow prosecutors to investigate
and to prosecute a broad array of crimes and would ensure that the CEA would apply to
innovative computer crimes. Unlike the EEA, the CEA would be solely directed against acts
intended to benefit a foreign government. The CEA should have separate provisions for hacking
directed at American economic and corporate infrastructure, and against American defense and
military computer infrastructure. The CEA would thus be the cyber espionage equivalent of §
1831 of the EEA.
Although the defense and intelligence communities should take the lead in combating
cyber warfare, there are three reasons that a separate statute criminalizing hacking/cyber warfare
is necessary. This would give federal prosecutors a tool that they could employ should American
intelligence officials discover that persons within the United States are either engaging in
hacking or aiding the Chinese or other foreign governments in hacking. Attacks emanating
solely from outside the United States would be under the jurisdiction of the Pentagon or a related
agency. Although it is difficult to trace the origin of hacking, it is not impossible. 195 A teenage
hacker in Massachusetts, for instance, recently pled guilty to acts including hacking into
corporate computer systems. 196 Similar to the enactment of § 1831 of the EEA, which allowed
the Justice Department to play an active role in prosecuting the theft of trade secrets, the CEA
would give federal prosecutors and the Department of Justice a significant role in investigating
hacking attacks as they occur and in preparing evidence for potential criminal indictments. Any
individuals who engage in hacking on behalf of a foreign government, even if not directly
195 See Daniel A. Morris, Tracing a Computer Hacker, U.S. ATT'Ys BULL., May 2001,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamay20012.htm.
196 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Juvenile Hacker Pleads Guilty, Nov. 18, 2008,
http://www.cybercrime.gov/dshockerPlea.pdf'
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sponsored by the government in question. This would include independent cyber attacks
committed by persons who acted, albeit without authority, on behalf of a foreign government,
and would be prosecuted under this statute rather than under § 1030(a)(1) or the EEA. The CEA,
however, should be viewed as a tool that prosecutors could use in conjunction with the EEA in
investigating and prosecuting new and more sophisticated forms of trade secret theft, hacking,
and cyber espionage.
Second, a distinct cyber espionage-hacking statute would serve as a public warning to the
Chinese government and others, that the United States is willing to devote significant resources
into investigating and, if feasible, prosecuting foreign-sponsored hacking. Indeed, the very
passage of the statute, and the concomitant press coverage that would follow, could serve as a
very significant public acknowledgement by the Obama Administration that it is aware of
ongoing Chinese hacking and that it intends to make this matter a national security priority. The
enactment of the CEA would serve as a useful counterpart to military initiatives designed to
disrupt and counter Chinese hacking and could serve as a basis for a series of frank U.S.-Chinese
discussions over American concerns about China's computer warfare technology.
Third, because hacking that intentionally disrupts or disables military computer
infrastructure vital to the national defense is more akin to an act of war than a crime, the
statutory maximum penalty for prison time under the proposed CEA should be of a significantly
higher duration than the penalty for § 1030(a)(1) crimes. The statutory penalty for § 1030(a)(1)
illegal access to a computer and obtaining of information "with reason to believe such
information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of
any foreign nation" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(A) as either a maximum of ten or
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twenty years depending on whether the defendant had committed or had attempted another §
1030(a)(1) crime. 197 Rather than ten- and twenty-year maximum sentences, the CEA should
allow for prosecutors to seek up to life imprisonment if it could be shown that the defendant's
hacking activities both (1) intentionally and significantly disrupted American military and/or
defense computer infrastructure and that (2) such an act served as the proximate cause of death
of any American government official or service member. This second factor would ensure that
minor disruptive cyber attacks were treated differently than cyber attacks that seriously impaired
American economic, military, or political, capabilities. For instance, a cyber attack that impaired
military command-and-control systems that lead to the death of an American serviceman would
be treated differently from a minor cyber attack that proved to be little more than a nuisance.
That said, both Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission could be asked to outline
the basic parameters of what would be fair and just terms of imprisonment under the proposed
CEA.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 has been a
necessary, but not sufficient, means of countering Chinese economic espionage in the United
States. While Congress rightly defined economic espionage in terms of the theft of trade secrets
and defined trade secrets broadly, countering economic espionage is not a job solely for law
enforcement and the legal system. Indeed, private actors, the State Department, and the Defense
Department, all must work together to counter Chinese espionage. However, in light of the new
threat of cyber espionage from Beijing, the EEA provides a useful model for Congress, which
should enact new, comprehensive anti-hacking legislation, and for the Obama Administration,
197 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) (2008), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(1)(A-B) (2008).
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which should treat the threat of Chinese economic espionage and cyber warfare on a similar to
that of terrorism
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